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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, a
Utah Corporation,

:
:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

vs.

:
:
:

PATRICIA M. BURKE,

:

Case No. 860070-CA

Defendant/Respondent. :
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Trial Court erred in granting
Motion to Dismiss, which was

Respondent's

in effect, a Motion

for

Summary

Judgment, when there were genuine issues of fact and law to be
determined.
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The case was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals and on
December 7, 1987, Judge Norman H. Jackson, of the Utah Court of
Appeals filed the opinion affirming the Trial Court's decision.
That

a

copy

of

that

opinion

is

attached

hereto

as

"Addendum 1".
JURISDICTION
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is brought pursuant

to Rule 42 of the Utah Supreme Court Rules.
case

was

County,

in

the

State

Third

of

Utah

Judicial
before

sitting without a jury.

District

the

The Hearing on this
Court

Honorable

of

Salt

Judith

Lake

Billings,

The matter was appealed to the Supreme

Court of the State of Utah and was thereafter transferred to the
Utah

Court

of Appeals and a decision was made on December 7,

1987.
Prior to the expiration of the thirty

(30) days period

within in which to file this Petition, an Ex Parte Motion for an
Extension of Time was made and a corresponding Order was signed
by Justice Richard Howe of the Utah Supreme Court, extending the
time for filing the Writ of Certiorari for an additional thirty
(30) days or until February 7, 1988.
Jurisdiction
Rule

43

of

the

is conferred

Supreme

Court

upon

this

Court

Rules, State

pursuant to

of Utah,

in that

Appellant contends that the decision of the Court of Appeals in
this case

is in conflict with the previous decisions

of this

Court concerning the nature of Summary Judgment proceedings and
therefore, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari is proper.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
1)

Rules 41 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In
Corporation,

the

original

filed

an

proceeding,

action

against

the

Plaintiff,

the

Defendant,

a

Utah

alleging

fraudulent actions on the part of the Defendant in acquiring a
piece of property in which the Plaintiff claimed an interest.

The

Plaintiff

. . L" Ui i i . t . i ' j
The

included

iilt-o

an

i n i t i a,3

Complain:.

Defendant

trio
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submission
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brought
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The matter was appealed to tL* i"t\r: Coui t
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
P

1

o p e r a t i n g aompar;

acateu

a : u t udi\« c IT

•T> th° business

primarily

of selling

office

.* a . 1:, 1 ;s e n g a g e d
eauipment

ia

Lhe

Ii 1 ter moi 11 1 tc :i 1 1 a J € .a.
The

President

< 1

: 1 Lm:ip ( s"

at c k h o l d e r

< :"

Advance

B u s i n e s s - • • I •: rh a r i TM 1 r )•: c
1.. x.-v.j I.v^ <^. ,.,,.. * * »elonua;it w e r e e n g a g e d
proceedings

Li
that

*

UiciL

aeparato

iction

[uuia-edMs-j

a., v o r c e

Judicial

„*

Richai u Purke' ~

. •* i=* in wh ' •' ' !>*' p^rt ie^ resided, located

District

contention
-t

s^ ^ast
•

pastures was owned by Advance Business Equipmer*

f

1\

, ..3

was

not mar it •* 1 propert
1^-^.-,. *n c

aca^i^

'it a! vorce however, Judge Ernest

Baldwin, then Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, ruled
that the property was marital property and awarded the home to
the Defendant and the adjoining acreage to Richard Burke.
For
Defendant's

a

variety

original

of

reasons,

counsel,

reduced to writing until 1985.
the

form

of a Nunc

Pro

the

including
Divorce

the

Decree

death
was

of

never

The Decree was however, made in

Tunc Order and

following

the

signing

thereof, Richard Burke appealed to the Utah Supreme Court in Case
No.

2 04 04.

One

of

the

issues

in

that

appeal

was

Burke's

insistence that the property awarded to both he and his wife was
owned by the Plaintiff in this case and was not marital property.
(In June of 1987, the Utah Supreme Court upheld Judge Baldwin's
decision.)
The Defendant had advised Richard Burke during the period
of time during the divorce hearing in October of 1980 and the
initiation of this action, that she had placed a lis pendens on
the property and that she also intended to appeal, claiming that
the entire property should have been awarded to her, that is the
pasture land and the home.

(See R. pg. 2-4 and 40-43)

On approximately May 12, 1981, the Sheriff of Salt Lake
County Utah, sold to RoyType Division of Royal Business Machines,
a

Judgment

creditor

of

pasture land property.

the

Plaintiff

at

public

auction,

the

At that time, the Plaintiff did not have

sufficient money to pay the Judgment or purchase the property,
but had the six (6) month statutory redemption period provided by
Utah law.
During

that

time,

and

before

the

expiration

of

the

redemption

period,

Richard

Burke

was
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< f-;- Plaintiff
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-!v-hard Burke.
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..; 1984 to

establish

its

interest

in

the

misrepresentations of the Defendant.

property

based

upon

the

Following the filing of the

initial Complaint, (R. pg. 2-4), the Defendant filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment, alleging inter alia that misrepresentation had
not taken place and fraud had not been plead with particularity.
(R. pg. 24-29)
A hearing was held on the Motion on June 29, 1984.
pg. 39)

(R.

At that time, the Court denied the Motion for Summary

Judgment, dismissed the Complaint without prejudice and gave the
Plaintiff ten (10) days to plead fraud with particularity.

An

amended Complaint was filed within the required time, (R. pg. 4 042) in which the misrepresentation was plead with particularity.
The Defendant then filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state
a claim.

(R. pg. 47-48)

On September 7, 1984, following oral argument to the
Court, the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for no
cause of action and quieted title to the Defendant. (R. pg. 63)
That Order was appealed to the Supreme Court on October 18, 1984,
who thereafter transferred it to the Utah Court of Appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTION TO DISMISS WHICH WAS IN EFFECT,
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHEN
THERE WERE DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT AND
LAW, WHICH REQUIRED A FULL EVIDENTIARY
HEARING ON THE MERITS.
This Court has consistently taken the position that any
Summary proceeding, which is dispositive of the lawsuit, should

be viewed with great caution, so that a party whose cause might
have merit is not deprived of a right to have a full evidentiary
hearing so that a decision can be made on the merits of his case.
McBride v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 432, (Utah 1980)

In this case, the

Plaintiff filed an action to assert its rights in a piece of real
estate

in Salt Lake County.

The Plaintiff's basic cause of

action sounded in fraud, essentially the Plaintiff's position was
that

it

had

relied

on

certain

representations

made

by

the

Defendant which caused it to forebear in taking any action to
prevent the loss of its property in a foreclosure and quiet title
action.
There is no question that in fact, the Defendant did
maintain a lis pendens on the property which caused the property
to be encumbered and did not allow the Third Party Creditor
(RoyType)

to quiet

title to the action until the Defendant

removed her lis pendens.

Additionally, the lis pendens was

removed only when the Defendant herself, purchased the property
directly from the Third Party Creditor, which then allowed her to
accomplish what she had set out to do in the original divorce
proceeding, but which Judge Baldwin had not allowed.
Her motives therefore, in doing what she did are in
question and Plaintiff had the right to explore those through a
full evidentiary process.
very simple.

The factual dispute in the case is

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant made

certain representations to Richard Burke, upon which he relied,
to his detriment and that Defendant made such representations
deliberately, with the ultimate intent to cause the Plaintiff to

forebear

and

to

not

take

any

action to protect

itself and

therefore, accomplish what she had set out to do four (4) years
earlier in the divorce proceeding.
The Defendant of course, denies these allegations and
alleges that certain representations were not made and that her
actions were completely unrelated to her prior involvement with
Richard Burke and her frustration over the inability to obtain
the property in the Divorce Decree.
It is clear therefore, that there were disputed facts
which required a Trial.

Both the District Court and the Court of

Appeals seem to side step this issue as its appears obvious to
the Plaintiff that based upon that alone, the case should have
been

remanded

for Trial

and

focused on the aspect of Judge

Billings initial decision in which she indicated that even if the
allegations were correct, it would not affect the Plaintiff's
title to the property because of the Third Party intravention.
The problem with both this argument in the District Court
and the Utah Court of Appeals is that it failed to recognize two
important aspects of the case.
One, the

initial decision concerning the property in

question in the divorce proceeding was itself being appealed to
the Utah Supreme Court and had not been finalized at the time of
the hearing.

(The fact that it subsequently has been finalized,

has no bearing on the correctness of the decision at the time.)
Second,

the

Judgment

divesting

the

Plaintiff

of

its

interest in the property by the Third Party did not divest the
Plaintiff's

interest

that

it asserted against the Defendant,

which it would have had if the original Divorce Decree had been
modified in the appeal.
Again, the fact that the appeal was decided adversely to
Richard Burke has no bearing on the correctness of the Summary
Judgment decision at the time.
What is interesting, is that the case is now in the
posture that with the Supreme Court upholding of the Baldwin
divorce ruling, the subsequent property or the pasture land was
actually in the name of Richard Burke, who could be substituted
as a Plaintiff in this action, were it remanded for a new Trial
and

the

same

allegations

could

be

asserted

that

he

was

misrepresented by the Defendant and that the misrepresentations
of the Defendant damaged his interest in the property as it now
exists.
There is no question that if Plaintiff's contentions and
evidentiary assertions are true, that it, through Richard Burke,
relied upon statements of the Defendant to its detriment and lost
the ability to maintain an interest in the property, which it
would have had, had the lis pendens been maintained.

That is the

sole issue to be determined.
There were

conflicting

Affidavits

presented

to Judge

Billings at the time of the hearing, and there were certainly no
unrefuted

facts

that

would

have

allowed

for

any

summary

disposition.
The Court's decision in Gadd v. Olsen, 685 P. 2d 1041
(Utah 1984) concerning a summary proceeding follows a consistent
line of prior cases indicating that summary disposition should be

granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and even assuming the facts as asserted by the party moved
against to be true, that the party cannot prevail.
This
completely

case

simply

litigated

should

have

been

allowed

in a full evidentiary fashion.

to

be

Plaintiff

believes that it is still its right and the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals affirming the District Court should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon this Court's consistent decisions

concerning

summary proceedings, the District Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals

erred

in

first

granting

and

then affirming

a summary

proceeding in favor of the Defendant without a full evidentiary
hearing.
Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully request that this case
be remanded for Trial in the District Court so that the matter
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Advance Business Equipment, Inc.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Patricia Wade fka Patrica Burke,
Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Orme, Jackson and Garff

JACKSON, Judge:

Case No. 860070-CA

FILED
DEC 1 1
Timothy W. Snea
Clerk oi tte Court
Utah Court ol Appeal

Advance Business Equipment, Inc. ("ABE") seeks reversal of the
district cou'rfs dismissal of its fraud complaint with prejudice for
failure to state a claim. We affirm.
Before the spring of 1981, ABE was the record owner of
property in Salt Lake County that was nonetheless split between
Patricia Burke, now Patricia Wade ("Wade"), and Richard Burke
("Burke")/ the corporation's president and principal stockholder, in
a protracted divorce action. She was awarded the portion with a
home on it; he was awarded the adjacent undeveloped acreage. Both
parties were unhappy with this division and expressed their intent
to challenge it on appeal. She claimed she was entitled to an award
of the entire property; he claimed the entire property was business
property and not marital property subject to division in the divorce
action.
Although the parties* divorce trial took place in 1980, the
decree was not entered until 1984. In the meantime, on May 12,
1981, one of ABE's judgment creditors, RoyType, purchased the
property at a sheriffs sale. Neither Burke nor ABE redeemed the
property during the redemption period. RoyType obtained a sheriff's
deed to the property on January 27, 1982, which was recorded on
February 4, 1982.
The following November, RoyType filed a quiet title action
against ABE, Burke, and Wade. In April, 1983, a partial summary
judgment was entered in that action against only ABE and Burke,
declaring that they had no interest in the property and enjoining
them from asserting any claim in it adverse to RoyType's title.

Five days after the time for appeal of the partial summary judgment
ran out, Wade purchased the property from RoyType.
A year later, ABE filed this action vaguely alleging that Wade
had defrauded it out of the property. The original complaint was
dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead fraud with
particularity, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). The amended
complaint alleged that Wade told ABE she had placed a lis pendens on
the property while the divorce decree was pending because she
intended to appeal the decision to award her less than all of it and
that she would not "release" the lis pendens. It was further
alleged that Wade advised ABE, during the redemption period, that
her lis pendens would "protect the property from the RoyType
claim." ABE claimed to have been defrauded in that it relied on
these representations and "took no action to stop the RoyType
action." ABE sought an order transferring the property from Wade to
ABE upon its payment of the amount she had paid to RoyType for the
property.
In opposition to Wade's ensuing motion to dismiss, ABE filed
two affidavits. Richard Burke's merely states that Wade advised him
during the foreclosure process that she had a lis pendens on the
property to "in effect, cloud the title" during the appeal of the
divorce decree. That of Burke's attorney refers to irrelevant
representations made by the attorney for Roytype (not a party to
this action), by his own client and by Wade's attorney about her
placement of a lis pendens on the property and her intent to
challenge the property division on appeal of the divorce decree. He
also irrelevantly states his "understanding" that Roytype's partial
summary judgment against ABE and Burke did not alter any claim Burke
or ABE might have against Wade concerning the home. There is no
allegation of any representations by Wade to Burke's counsel.
The only issue raised by this appeal is whether the facts
alleged by ABE in its complaint and affidavits, if true,
sufficiently support a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. The
elements of such a claim are:
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a
presently existing material fact; (3)
which was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made
recklesslessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation; (5) for the purpose
of inducing the other party to act upon
it; (6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it;

860070-CA
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(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to
his injury and damage.
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). SQ& Horton v.
Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984); Pace v. Parrish, 122
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952).
We agree with the trial court that appellant's facts, even
if true, do not state a cause of action for fraud. Indeed,
several of its alleged facts would, as a matter of law, compel
the conclusion that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation.
There were only two representations by Wade which are even
alleged to have been false. The first is her purported
statement, "I will not release my lis pendens." It is arguable
that this was not a false representation since, as appellant's
counsel admitted at oral argument, Wade never did formally
release her lis pendens; that release was unnecessary in light
of her purchase of the subject property from RoyType. In any
event, even if we assume the statement to be false, it is
neither a material fact nor the cause of appellant's injury.
By ABE's own assertion, in its complaint and in its brief
on appeal, ABE had no defense to the foreclosure action by
Roytype and "had no way at the time to clear the judgment
within the normal six month [redemption] period.M Wade did
maintain her lis pendens at least until late April, 1983, when
ABE failed to appeal the adverse judgment in Roytype's quiet
title action. Despite appellant's unsupported insistence
otherwise, it had no interests in the property after that
point, regardless of whether Wade's lis pendens was
maintained. Once ABE's interests in the property were
extinguished in that action, the corporation had no way of
reviving its interests in the property, even if it was
subsequently determined in the divorce appeal to have been
business property.1
The second allegedly false representation by Wade is her
purported advice to ABE, during the redemption period, that her
lis pendens would "protect the property from the RoyType
claim." While it seems that appellant and its counsel believed

1. The district court's division and award of the property in
the divorce action was ultimately affirmed by the Utah Supreme
Court in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986).

860070-CA
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throughout this litigation that Wade's lis pendens would
somehow prevent RoyType from taking marketable title through
the foreclosure proceeding and quiet title action, her lis
pendens merely provided notice to RoyType (and other ABE
creditors) that she was claiming it all as marital property
that was or should have been awarded to her in the divorce
action. Roytype's title, acquired after purchase at the
sheriffs sale, was subject only to her rights in the property
as eventually adjudicated in the divorce appeal.
The doctrine of lis pendens preserves
the status quo by keeping the subject of
the lawsuit within the power and control
of the court until judgment or decree
shall be entered. The recording of a lis
pendens serves as a warning to all persons
that any rights or interests they may
acquire in the interim are subject to the
judgment or decree.
Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978).
See Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Utah
1979) .
Even assuming that Wade gave ABE erroneous legal advice
about the effect of her lis pendens on his interests, it is the
general rule that "misrepresentations of law or of the legal
effect of contracts and writings does [sic] not constitute
remedial fraud." Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d
264, 276 (1947) (quoting Ackerman v. Bramwell Inv. Co., 80 Utah
52, 12 P.2d 623, 626 (1932)). Appellant has not alleged any
special circumstances that might make this rule inapplicable.
See Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah 1984).
Furthermore, ABE was represented by the same counsel throughout
this case and the quiet title action, the same counsel who
represented Burke in the divorce. Neither ABE nor its attorney
could have reasonably relied on legal advice from Wade.
Because it appears to a certainty that ABE would not be
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of its claim, dismissal of the amended
complaint was appropriate. Freegard v. First Western Nat'l

860070-CA
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Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987). The order and judgment
below is affirmed. Costs to respondent.

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Regnal W. Garff, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

860070-CA

5

ED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEC 71937

ooOoo—
Advance Business Equipment, Inc.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Clert cf the Court
Utah CoJft ot Appeals

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Patricia Wade fka Patricia Burke,

Case No. 860070-CA

Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Orme, Jackson and Garff.

JACKSON, Judge:
Advance Business Equipment, Inc. ("ABE") seeks reversal of the
district court's dismissal of its fraud complaint with prejudice for
failure to state a claim. We affirm.
Before the spring of 1981, ABE was the record owner of
property in Salt Lake County that was nonetheless split between
Patricia Burke, now Patricia Wade ("Wade"), and Richard Burke
("Burke"), the corporation's president and principal stockholder, in
a protracted divorce action. She was awarded the portion with a
home on it; he was awarded the adjacent undeveloped acreage. Both
parties were unhappy with this division and expressed their intent
to challenge it on appeal. She claimed she was entitled to an award
of the entire property; he claimed the entire property was business
property and not marital property subject to division in the divorce
action.
Although the parties' divorce trial took place in 1980, the
decree was not entered until 1984. In the meantime, on May 12,
1981, one of ABE's judgment creditors, RoyType, purchased the
property at a sheriff's sale. Neither Burke nor ABE redeemed the
property during the redemption period. RoyType obtained a sheriff's
deed to the property on January 27, 1982, which was recorded on
February 4, 1982.
The following November, RoyType filed a quiet title action
against ABE, Burke, and Wade. In April, 1983, a partial summary
judgment was entered in that action against only ABE and Burke,
declaring that they had no interest in the property and enjoining
them from asserting any claim in it adverse to RoyType's title.

(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to
his injury and damage.
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980)- See Horton v.
Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984); Pace v. Parrish, 122
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952).
We agree with the trial court that appellant's facts, even
if true, do not state a cause of action for fraud. Indeed,
several of its alleged facts would, as a matter of law, compel
the conclusion that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation.
There were only two representations by Wade which are even
alleged to have been false. The first is her purported
statement, "I will not release my lis pendens.M It is arguable
that this was not a false representation since, as appellant's
counsel admitted at oral argument, Wade never did formally
release her lis pendens; that release was unnecessary in light
of her purchase of the subject property from RoyType. In any
event, even if we assume the statement to be false, it is
neither a material fact nor the cause of appellant's injury.
By ABE's own assertion, in its complaint and in its brief
on appeal, ABE had no defense to the foreclosure action by
Roytype and "had no way at the time to clear the judgment
within the normal six month [redemption] period." Wade did
maintain her lis pendens at least until late April, 1983, when
ABE failed to appeal the adverse judgment in Roytype's quiet
title action. Despite appellant's unsupported insistence
otherwise, it had no interests in the property after that
point, regardless of whether Wade's lis pendens was
maintained. Once ABE's interests in the property were
extinguished in that action, the corporation had no way of
reviving its interests in the property, even if it was
subsequently determined in the divorce appeal to have been
business property.1
The second allegedly false representation by Wade is her
purported advice to ABE, during the redemption period, that her
lis pendens would "protect the property from the RoyType
claim." While it seems that appellant and its counsel believed

1. The district court's division and award of the property in
the divorce action was ultimately affirmed by the Utah Supreme
Court in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986).
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Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987). The order and judgment
below is affirmed. Costs to respondent.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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REMITTITUR
Advance Business Equipment, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Court of Appeals No. 860070-CA

v.

Third Dist., Salt Lake County,
No. C-84-3072

Patricia M. Burke,
Defendant and Respondent.

This cause having been heretofore argued and
submitted, and the Court being sufficiently
advised in the premises, it is now ordered,
adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the
trial court herein be, and the same is,
affirmed.

Costs to Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Judge; REGNAL W. GARFF and GREGORY K. ORME,

Judges, concur.
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